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THE MONETARY ORDER 
1. Proposals for a free monev supplv 
1.2. Introduction; the existing monetary order 
Monetarists, though staunch supporters of laissez-faire and competition, have 
never questioned the government monopoly of the supply of base money and have 
always stressed the need for the monetary authorities to regulate the total money 
supply. Where they differ from economists of a more interventionist bent is in 
their opposition to discretionary policies and, conversely, their advocacy of 
following rules. This pertains not only to monetary policy but is characteristic 
for their view of the role of government in general (cf Friedman 1962 Ch. 2, on 
The Role of Government in a Free Society). In all this they, like virtually 
everybody else, have taken the existing monetary order for granted. 
For our purposes we .maxM^ esjgxifcê-jA£--fixl.SXl,r'-S-- ""W^E^-T order as a two-
laye_Ee,d system, or^^^^c^^slst^n^^^^^^^^^^^bank or the monetary authori-
ties and the othjy^_maj|ej!^_ The monetary authorities provide 
base money, supervise the banking system and act as lender of last resort. The 
commercial banks run the payments system, grant credit and accept deposits. These 
deposits are denominated in a unit of account which is tied to the government-
supplied base money. Deposits are of various kinds, one of which functions as the 
means of exchange. The banks stand ready to supply currency, i.e., base money, to 
their depositors at par. If one wishes, one might discern a third layer, made up 
of non-bank financial institutions. These institutions provide their clients with 
non-checkable deposits and other financial instruments. They themselves hold 
deposits in the commercial banks and payments made by their clients to clients of 
other non-bank financial institutions take place through the intermediary of the 
commercial banks. 
1.2. Alternatives for the existing monetary order 
Latterly alternatives have been developed for the existing monetary order, which 
come from two directions. There are those who advocate more laissez-faire and 
competition than the monetarists ever dreamt of, in a system where banks perform 
very much the same functions as in the present system. A second group of people 
sketches the outlines of a another variant of a drastically deregulated system, 
where the difference between banks and other financial institutions becomes 
blurred and money as such hardly exists. Unlike the first group they are, one 
feels, not so much driven by a wish to reform the present system but first of all 
by intellectual curiosity. 
1.2.1. Competlng Currencies 
The attack on the present monetary order came from Friedrich Hayek, foliowed by 
Vaubel (many publications, e.g., Vaubel 1985). One, qf, .Hayejk' s main preoccupations 
has always been the debasement-^of...the'cufrency which may result, and in his view 
hardly ever fails to result, from the government's power over the money supply. 
Governments are under constant pressure to increase the money supply in order to 
ensure full employment or to fulfil other wishes of pressure groups (Hayek 1978b 
p. 21). This cannot but end in inflation (which in Hayek's analysis causes 
distortions in the production structure that can only be remedied through a 
depression). In Hayek's eyes Keynesian macroeconomics is the main culprit and in 
a sideswipe at Keynes he describes him as a kind of reincarnation of John Law, 
though he does not want to blame him for the post-war inflationary policies 
carried out in his name, for which, in the British case, he tends to hold Kaldor 
responsible instead (Hayek 1978a p. 230). Governments cannot be trusted to pro-
vide people with trustworthy money. They "have incessantly and everywhere abused 
their trust to defraud the people" (Hayek 1978b p. 26). Money is "a tooi of 
government for fleecing us and for 'managing' the economy" (Hayek 1984a p. 325; 
1984b p. 31). 
EfaYjejkNs_j8oJLujtip^ ^ the right of goyerments to create 
money, butthedjitroduction of competine currencies (hereafter denoted by CC) or, 
as Vaubel (1978 p. 90) calls them, parallel currencies. In such a system 
different money units function in the same geographical area. Hayek does not 
HIT f-i i-i-i |-*l i • • M . ii ni.r-ii f -ir ';;;[_PTI rrV
 V|.,....JT:.~.....f|..-rx..r.r,.... J 
provide a detailed blueprint of a competitive system (Fischer, 1986 p. 434, calls 
Hayek's proposal, 1984b, "messianic, not analytic"). That would of course run 
counter to his philosophy of society, which holds that competition is 
incomparably superior to government planning as a means to find or invent the 
best solution to a problem (cf Hayek 1944 and, on the subject of the monetary 
order, Hayek 1984a p. 324} 1984b p. 31). Prj.va^w fj.rms should be allowed to 
CTeate___thelr__gwn„.jyM^ - government.s. Besides, 
countries (firstf of all within the European Community) should leave their citi-
zens_jEree %p_yxs&,Ss^m%MS^S^XXSüRX&M (Hayek 1978 p. 225, see on this subject also 
the detailed study by Vaubel, 1978). Hayek expects that currency competition 
would hardly affect retail transactions, but would most of all bear on the 
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willingness to hold money (Hayek 1978 p. 227). Competition between issuers will 
lead to the solution that best fulfils the wishes of the public, possibly even to 
the use of ounces of gold (ibidem). It is worth noting that Hayek, even though 
for most of his life he sung the praises of the gold Standard, already toyed with 
this idea before the second world war (Hayek 1937 p. 77, see also Visser 1989). 
1.2.2. New Monetarv Economies 
The other strand in the clamour for freedom from state interference, known as the 
New Monetarv Economies (NME), envisages a system where money as we know it hardly 
exists. NME, with Black (1970) and Fama (1980) as its main originators and 
GreenfJLeld and Yeager (1983) as its propagandists, draws a picture of a financial 
S Y S t e m w h e r e
 Mnk^^jre^mnleJ^eijL^^^ , &pj^Ssj^sSS4M^,ixaRJÉA,JMBQS,iXJ,QX>-
• °^L~&MSiiS^SÈSBil^S2i-s (°^ cour se, when one looks for them, predecessors can be 
found; see Cowen and Kroszner 1987). There are no reserve requirements and there 
is no central bank. Banks create deposits as part of their loanmaking business. 
The dividing line between demand deposits and other liabilities of the financial 
institutions gets blurred. Payments are made as in the existing system by writing 
checks or making remittances. Deposits are rather like shares in a money market 
mutual or an investment fund and therefore in principle have no fixed value in 
terms of the unit of account. 
Banks have two main functions in this system. Firstly, they provide a book-
keeping system whereby claims held on them by the public are transferred from one 
depositor to another, i.e., they provide a payments mechanism. Secondly, they 
manage portfolios of financial instruments, i.e., they are financial interme-
coercive basis) and may be defined, e.g., as a certain amount of a good or a 
bundie of commodities. It could also be left to the market to agree on a unit of 
account. Note that only a definition is involved;„Jtite,i^ _^  
the bundie of goods making up the unit of account involved. NME is quite 
different from a commodity reserve Standard, it is meant to be a one-layer system 
and the goods making up the bundie consequently need not be storable. If the unit 
of account is defined as a bundie of a large number of goods, prices of 
individual goods may of cause fluctuate, but the general price level in terms of 
the unit of account will be quite stable. Tbg^vnltjo^^ 
payment are entirely separated. For some kinds of payments, currency may be more 
convenient than deposits. The system could be completed by the government 
standing ready to provide currency against payment into its accounts with the 
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banks. 
From the viewpoint of the NME, the usual views on money supply do not apply 
in an unregulated environment, if only becjajss_j&e__juiai^^ 
defined. If constructs such as the quantity theory are valid, it is only in a 
system with government regulation and because of government regulation (cf Hall 
1982 p. 1552). 
1.2.3. Similarities and differences between CC and NME 
The competing currencies proposal or CC and NME seem to share some characte-
ristics. In neither system there is prudential supervision by the monetary 
authorities or are the banks compelled to hold deposits with the central bank. 
Both are meant to be one-layered systems. Where J^ eX™^ J^S£^ -.i§--»£-feS£..-.iB~..fl 
competinj>.j£,urxenc^^^ banks_j&xealaL-d&paaiJUL^^Qwn unit of account, 
whilst NME proponents tend to highly value the informational advantages of using 
one common .unit—of HP.cmint. even though the media of exchange may differ. 
Furthermore, under„CC, unlike NME, there is a clear distinction between checkable 
dejt°g.i1:s M d ° t h e r liabilities of the finan^ lai^ JjLS.tl£H.t;Jjana.. 
Aside from these radical approaches a claim could be made for the abolition 
of government interference in a system that for the rest is quite similar to the 
existing one, with the government providing coin and private banks creating money 
virtually without prudential supervision, much like Scotland had from the 
beginning of the eighteenth century till 1846. We focus on CC and NME, but will 
refer to such a deregulated two-layered system where relevant. 
2. More on the working of free-monev-supplv svstems 
2.1. CC 
Under CC, the principles of a free market would be applied to money production as 
it is to any other private industry. The owner of a certain 'brand' of money, say 
the dollar, could offer them to the public all over the world and could sell 
licenses to produce and sell this product. This is unlike the present situation, 
where Eurobanks can produce dollars without the American monetary authorities 
having any say in it (Salin 1984 pp. 13-'4). 
Money producers jwouM^JLJ^d^ the fear 
of depositors withdrawing their funds. But Hayek admits that banks face a problem 
4 
when trying to keep the purchasing power of their deposits constant. A purchasing 
P9wex_^ua£aji£e.e of sorts _is_involved. Thtfiuijn8li£A_JdMJi_J^^ 
ready to supply the public in exchanee for one_aini.t.-jQ£-JÜieix_jowja_iiKaieJL-wi such 
an amount of other kinds or brands of monev as would be needed to buy the bundie 
of commodities which defines that unit (Hayek 1984b p. 37 ff.). Friedman rightly 
observes that for that guarantee to be given, the banks should hold assets 
carrying a fixed purchasing-power guarantee, which is hard to imagine unless 
governments issue securities with a purchasing-power guarantee (Friedman 1984 p. 
43). A peculiar problem could arise if depositors want to change large amounts of 
other brands of money for one particular bank's money. That bank would be saddled 
with the problem of finding sufficiently attractive investment outlets for the 
amounts received. If it did not freely accept the other kinds of money, that 
would drive up the price of its own money in terms of other monies, whicAh would 
make loans supplied by that bank less attractive as it would raise the real rate 
of interest charged. In order to keep the purchasing power of the money they 
create roughly constant, banks would have to adjust their deposit and lending 
rates or to vary the margin between the buying and selling rates of other monies. 
Hayek expects that such a system would lead to a number of monies that all 
have a relatively stable purchasing power and are also stable in terms of each 
other. If they are stable in terms of each other, that would be the result of the 
banks' attempts to keep the purchasing power of their monies constant, not of any 
agreement to maintain fixed rates. Consequently, there need be no fear of the 
working of Gresham's Law (cf Hayek 1984a p. 326, Starbatty 1982). 'Bad' money, 
i.e., money which depreciates in terms of goods, will not drive 'good' money from 
circulation, as it will depreciate in terms of 'good' money. It is quite 
possible that 'bad' money stays in circulation notwithstanding this 
depreciation, provided deposits pay a high enough rate of interest to compensate 
for the fall in purchasing power. 
2.2. NME 
In the NME system, there would be a common unit of account. The government would 
not itself create money, except perhaps currency to fuifil the need for small 
change. lts budget deficit would in its entirety have to be covered by borrowings 
from the public or the banks. It would conduct its financial af f airs like any 
other economie agent through its accounts with the banking system. 
Deposits can be seen as claims on or shares in the investment portfolio of a 
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bank. Fluctuations in the value of the bank's investments, expressed in the unit 
of account, are reflected in changes in the value of the depositors' claims. 
Greenfield and Yeager (1983 p. 308) feel that the financial institutions could 
provide the public with currency in the form of shares, though it is hard to see 
how they could adjust the circulating shares for losses and profits. 
Alternatively, financial institutions could issue debt instruments with a fixed 
value in terms of the unit of account (Fama 1980 p. 41). The investment portfolio 
of such an institution could consist of relatively riskless assets or, 
alternatively, other depositors would have to bear a higher risk. 
2.3. Money growth and the price level 
2.3.1. Money growth 
In a competing-currency system, there are identifiable money assets. In order to 
keep inflation in check, no such thing as a Friedmanian money growth rule is 
needed, because money issuers will in their own interest try to maintain the 
purchasing power of their monetary liabilities. In a NME world, the very idea of 
a money growth rule, or of any other way of monetary control, is irrelevant, 
because the dividing lines between money and other assets are fluid (cf Yeager 
1985 p. 103). 
2.3.1. The price level under CC 
An interesting question is whether in a deregulated system the price level would 
be determined. It is conceivable for the price level in a one-layer system to be 
indeterminate. Such was the case in the pure credit or inside money economy as 
described by Wicksell (1965) and Gurley and Shaw (1960 p. 253 ff., cf also Visser 
1974 pp. 138-'40, ISO-'l)), where banks can, by lending at rates differing from 
the natural rate. i.e., the equilibrium rate of interest at which the volume of 
savings equals the volume of lending, make the price level rise or f all without 
limit (apart from the lower limit of zero, of course). In a one-layer system, 
credit expansion is not restrained by a demand for currency from the part of the 
public. It is conceivable that competition between banks, with the public 
preferring deposits with a constant purchasing power, would suffice to prevent 
wild price fluctuations from occurring. If, though, deposits carry competitive 
interest rates, in the sense that the rate paid on deposits whose value falls in 
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terms of other 'brands' of money fully compensates for that f all (and there are 
no distorting taxes), the price level does indeed seem to be indeterminate. 
2.3.3. The price level under NME 
Under NME, deposits with banks are claims on a fraction of the bank's investment 
portfolio which will generally have a fluctuating but not systematically rising 
or falling value in terms of the Standard bundie defining the unit of account. 
McCallum (1985 pp. 35-'6) expresses the fear that, if financial institutions 
bring notes into circulation, they will be tempted to issue these to excess. 
Notes can hardly be imagined to carry interest. By issuing notes financial insti-
tutions have at their disposal a cheap means of acquiring interest-bearing 
assets. Prices, even those of the Standard bundie, would rise in terms of the 
unit of account. Put differently, the unit of account would be at a discount in 
terms of the Standard bundie. But is not the summed value of a bank's 
liabilities, expressed in the unit of account, equal to the market value of the 
bank's investment portfolio? Any excessive issue of banknotes with a fixed 
nominal value will be at the cost of the value of the deposits or claims on, i.e. 
shares in, the investment portfolio. Contrary to McCallum's view, it seems that 
an excessive note issue need not put the Standard bundie's use as the unit of 
account in jeopardy. It may be expected, furthermore, that the depositors and 
shareholders of an over-expanding bank will correct its management or that 
depositors will withdraw their deposits, which will force the banks to shut up 
shop if they refuse to mend their ways. 
2.4. Is a one-lavered svstem conceivable? 
A one-layered system as described above is unlikely to spring up under laissez-
faire. Both under CC and under NME, financial institutions need a means of 
payment to settle net positions vis-a-vis each other. As for NME, Greenfield and 
Yeager (1986 p. 848) draw a picture of claims being settled at a clearinghouse 
with "issuers transfer[ring] not quantities of the Standard bundie itself, but 
redemption property worth as many Standard bundies as the number of units to be 
settled". But what makes up that redemption property? It may mean claims held by 
one bank on another, but banks will only be willing to open credit lines to other 
banks on a limited scale. It may also mean financial assets held by the 
remitting bank as part of its investment portfolio. The latter solution is 
suggested by Greenfield and Yeager (1983 p. 307), though they hardly address the 
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question seriously. But that tnight imply relatively high transaction costs, not 
least because one bank's preferred portfolio differs from another bank's 
preferred portfolio and negotiations are needed for each transaction. Problems 
would also arise because the prices of the securities fluctuate over a day and 
the parties involved could try to influence them (White 1986 p. 851). It is 
highly probable then that one type of asset evolves into a dominant monev. be it 
a currency created by a monetary authority or gold or other commodities; and in 
that case we are back with a two-layered system. The dominant money will be 
demanded by the banks as reserves against deposits. As a dominant money arises 
precisely because banks feel a need for a means of exchange with a fixed nomina 1 
value, prices will be expressed in terms of that dominant money. The price level 
may fluctuate again, depending on the demand for and the supply of the dominant 
money. A stable supply of the dominant money does not guarantee a stable price 
level, though. Shifts in the proportion of transactions conducted with deposits 
relative to those conducted with currency may very well occur (Helpman 1983). 
Under CC a dominant money is likely to arise for the same reasons as under 
NME. As a 'brand' of money with a stable purchasing power will be preferred, 
there is no question of an undetermined price level. 
3. Claimed benefits of a free monev supply 
3.1. NME 
Advocates of a free money supply claim that it does away with a number of the 
problems plaguing economies with a heavily regulated two-layered financial 
sector. In the NME case this is because money as we know it no longer exists, 
whilst the disadvantages of a barter system are yet avoided. Greenfield and 
Yeager (1983 p. 308 ff.) cite the following advantages: 
(i) There would be a stable unit of account, which has obvious benefits for 
borrowing and lending, calculation etcetera. 
(ii) The government would come under financial discipline. It could nolonger 
resort to inflationary finance. 
(iii) Unrestricted competition between financial institutions would exert disci-
pline on them and would provide the much-vaunted spur to innovation which in 
Hayek's view is what characterises a market economy, whilst wasteful attempts to 
get around regulations would be a thing of the past. 
(iv) The absence of base money, i.e., a one-layered system, would bring more 
stability to the financial sector. There would no longer be multiple contractions 
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or expansions of the money supply in response to changes in the base money 
supply. Nor would there be runs on banks on the scale seen bef ore the 
introduction of deposit insurance (in this respect there would not be much dif-
ference with the present situation). Put differently, there would be no 'internal 
drain', i.e, no substitution of bank money into base money. Runs on badly-managed 
financial institutions could of course occur, buth these would not spread to 
other institutions (again not much different than the existing situation, where 
the central bank fulfils its role as a lender of last resort in accordance with 
Walter Bagehot's famous advice to the central bank to lend readily in times of 
panic, cf Bagehot 1920 pp. 48, 298). 
(v) With the disappearance of money as a clearly defined separateentity, 
macroeconomic monetary disorders would disappear as well. There could be no 
excess supply of or excess demand for money rocking either the general price 
level or the level of real activity. 
3.2. CC 
Hayek's competing currencies world lacks a common unit of account, but units of 
account could be stable. Individual banking firms may fail and its depositors may 
suffer a loss, but creditors holding claims on other economie agents expressed in 
the unit of account in which the failed bank's money was expressed, do not see 
the value of their claims impaired (Hayek 1984b pp. 40-'l). The credit system 
would not suffer, therefore. Governments would under CC come under financial 
discipline, too. If the government resorted to inflationary financed budget defi-
cits, the money it created would rise in volume and f all in value and conse-
quently run the danger of being driven from the market. Vaubel (1985 p. 550) 
believes that competition between central bank monies could help to abate 
inflation in still another way. People in inflation-ridden countries would hold 
their governments responsible for the f all in the value of money, both in terms 
of purchasing power and in terms of other currencies. Fr these effects to occur 
it does, however, not seem necessary to allow full-fledged currency competition. 
The third and the fourth points in favour of the NME system would go for the 
competing currencies case as well. Though Hayek does not expect a blurring of the 
boundaries between money and other assets, his system might conceivably be less 
prone to macroeconomic disorders from monetary sources than a two-layer system. 
Multiple money supply expansions and contractions in response to changes in the 
base money supply are of course absent. Substantial changes in the volume of any 
type of money in circulation will not have far-reaching consequences because 
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holder s would fear a f all in the purchasing power of the money concerned or, in 
the case of a contraction, debtors would fear a rise in the purchasing power and 
in both cases a substitution by other types of money would follow. As for finan-
cial crises, the same claims as in the NHE case can be made. 
4. Obiections to a free monev supply 
4.1. Economies of scale in the use and the production of monev 
On a very general level, a case can be made for the abolition of government 
regulation if the means of payment can be seen as in no way different than other 
goods. But that is a very big 'if'. In a way money as a means of payment resem-
bles a telephone exchange, and the use of money as a unit of account resembles a 
language. Comparisons like these suggest that a kind of monopoly mightbe useful 
(cf Hellwig 1985 p. 572). This concerns external economies in the use of money. 
With more people using a certain type of money, the utility of using that kind of 
money increases. Increased use of a certain type of money tends to reduce its 
transactions costs, including information costs (e.g., Brunner and Meltzer 1971; 
Tullock 1975). It is much easier to have to use one language than several lan-
guages; anyone who has experienced the American telephone system will understand 
that it is easier to live with one network than with a higher number. More 
currencies mean more transaction costs, prominent among them information costs, 
the more so if exchange rates between the various currencies are not well 
predictable. These costs include the costs of investigating the solidity of the 
money supplier (Illing 1985 p. 124). People may be of course be interested in 
investing their wealth in financial instruments denominated in different units of 
account, in order to better spread their risks. When they are f ree to do so, as 
they are in a number of countries, that does not imply the use of various types 
of money simultaneously as means of payment (which Hayek admittedly did not 
expect). 
Another question is whether there are economies of scale in the production 
of money. Such intemal economies of scale would imply a natural monopoly. The 
disappearance of very small banks suggests there are, but probably only over a 
certain range. Nor do they seem to be very strong (see for empirical research 
Benston 1972, Gilbert 1983, Humphrey 1987). 
In a completely deregulated system, another aspect comes to the fore. With 
no lender of last resort, economie agents will be more careful in choosing a 
financial institution with which to hold their deposits. Those institutions will 
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have to invest in creating a good name, in what Claassen (1984 p. 51) calls the 
qualitv of money, first of all by good behaviour, but bigness also helps to 
create confidence. That too acts as a restriction on competition. 
4.2. Money and a govemment monopoly 
Even if money were a natural monopoly or if economies of scale in the use of 
money would justify a restriction of competition, it does not follow that a go-
vemment monopoly is called for. The govemment may instead regulate a private 
monopoly or auction a monopoly license. In a two-layer system as we know it the 
govemment of cour se only has a monopoly for the supply of base money. In a one-
layer system a natural monopoly might induce the govemment to throw up 
impediments to other potential suppliers. However, we do, as Hayek and Vaubel 
stress, not know what an optimal type of money looks like, and a govemment mono-
poly denies the market the possibility to find out which solution is best (cf 
Vaubel 1984a pp. 46-'7). If the govemment does have a natural advantage in the 
production of money, that should become apparent in the market place, without 
restrictions on entry for other potential producers and without subsidies for the 
govemment money supplier (Vaubel, ibidem). 
4.3. Instabilitv 
Another moot point is the claim that a lender of last resort is superfluous under 
free money supply. Is it really that far-fetched to imagine that a failure of one 
banking institution could lead to runs on others? Banks have an obligation to 
supply other brands of money in exchange for their own brand on demand. If banks 
hold claims on other banks, a failure would obviously undermine their solidity in 
the eyes of the public. Banks that do not hold claims on a failed bank might be 
affected as well. The result would be a scramble for currency provided by the 
monetary authorities, if that is available. In other words, a classical internal 
drain would occur; a typical case for central bank intervention. In a system 
without currency provided by the central govemment, however, the public would 
have no choice but to stick with their deposits, though they might try to 
substitute deposits held with a bank deemed to be in danger for deposits held by 
a safer one. A case can be made for the proposition that, if there is a danger of 
a panic spreading to many financial institutions, rational bank managers would 
decide to help their brethren in difficulty. This happened in Scotland under the 
very free banking system in force before 1846. When the Ayr Bank failed in 1772, 
two of the three big banks announced that they would accept the notes of the 
11 
failed bank, which helped to avert a panic (Gorton 1985 p. 270). For such 
measures to be taken, probably a small number of big institutions must exist, 
which each of them can to a large extent internalize the benefits from a rescue 
operation or that can easily act in concert. 
With various currencies vying for the public's favour, there is a danger of 
another kind of instability. The confidence of the public as regards the future 
purchasing power of a currency may be weakened or increased by a multitude of 
causes. This may lead to erratic behaviour of the exchange rates between the 
currencies, like we have seen on international currency markets after 1973. 
Hayek, however, expects exchange rates under CC to remain quite stable and it 
is, indeed, quite conceivable that money suppliers seek to create confidence in 
their products by guaranteeing convertibility into another currency or other 
currencies at fixed rates. But this makes the emergence of a dominant currency 
probable, or a small number of dominant currencies, each one concentrated in a 
certain geographical area. In that case we are back with a two-layered system, 
which might consist of a few blocks of currencies, cutting across national 
frontiers. 
Deposit money is created by a stroke of the pen, or by touching a few keys 
on a keyboard. Is there no danger of private money suppliers trying to expand 
money production to the point where marginal revenue equals the putative zero 
marginal cost, one might well ask. The answer is no, because the marginal cost of 
overexpansion, in terms of loss of confidence on the part of the public in the 
stability of the purchasing power of money, is very high. Banks then have only an 
incentive to overexpand if the monies produced by the different suppliers are 
indistinguishable homogeneous products (identical notes and coins). In that case 
they can reap the benefits themselves and shift the costs for the most part to 
others (but if every bank acts in this way, they will ultimately all suffer). The 
public will only be willing to hold a bank's liabilities if the bank has created 
sufficiënt confidence in its product. For this it must have a clean record of 
non-inflationary money creation and, especially at entering the business of 
banking but later as well, it must hold a supply of other means of payments and 
stand ready to convert the public's deposit holdings on demand into other kinds 
of money or financial assets or even bundies of commodities (cf Klein 1974 p. 
434). 
There remains the possibility that banks in a Hayekian world first create 
confidence, and next use the good name they have created to harvest a rich profit 
by suddenly expanding the volume of their deposits, such that a non-expected high 
rate of inflation follows. This phenomenon is called dvnamic inconsistencv. A 
bank will only act this way if the short-term profit expected from deceiving the 
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public outweighs the resulting long-term loss from eating into its 'brand-name 
capital*. With the public having the choice to demand other currencies at will, 
such behaviour can, however, never be long drawn out. The money issued by an 
over-expanding bank depreciates not only in terms of goods but in terms of other 
currencies and clients defect to other banks. Or, with fixed rates of exchange, 
other banks see their claims on the over-expanding bank increase and demand 
payment. The over-expanding bank is in this vay forced into discipline or fails. 
In the latter case, depositors lose their money. There will always remain a 
principal-agent type of problem in the relationship between a bank and its 
clients (as stressed by Illing 1985 p. 125 and Summers (1983 p. 161). 
4.4. Further obiections 
The separation of the unit of account and the means of payment under NME may 
not be to the public's liking. Claims on a part of a financial institution's 
asset portfolio vary in value, which is nothing else than that the value of one's 
balance with a financial institution fluctuates in terms of the unit of account. 
In other words, the public may prefer to hold demand deposits; which, as we have 
seen, the financial institutions could provide along with other liabilities if 
part of the public is willing to run higher risks. Another point, advanced by 
White (1984 p. 707) is that a payments system with demand deposits is probably 
much cheaper to run than a payments system where shares in mutual funds have to 
be transferred. 
Finally, if there are more money suppliers, there is a greater danger of 
counterfeit, which creates higher social costs. In a NME world, where the 
importance of banknotes and coin is played down, this problem is more or less 
assumed away. In a competing currencies system the problem cannot be ignored, 
though it is doubtful whether it would be more serious than the present situation 
where bank branches accept foreign banknotes. After all, entry barriers would be 
quite high, because first the necessary trust must have been built up before an 
institution can create money on any large scale. The total number of money 
suppliers would, therefore, not be very high and some of them might choose to 
supply money denominated in a common currency. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
5.1. Deregulation and inflation 
It has been claimed that the devaluation of money is a result of governments 
pursuing ill-conceived short-term macroeconomic aims (apart from Hayek, see also 
Tullock 1975 p. 497). This in itself does not seem sufficiënt reason for a shift 
to NME or CC. Free financial markets imply competition in the sense that economie 
agents are free to choose any currency for their payments, investments and 
contracts. But competition between currencies might still remain within the 
boundaries of a two-layered system with government-created base money. The 
problem then remains of how to keep inflationary policies by the monetary 
authorities in check. If, as has been argued, the seat of the trouble is the 
short time-horizon of the policy makers, one solution is to leave monetary policy 
with people who have a vested interest in keeping inflation low. This is an 
argument in favour of having relatively independent central banks, as in Germany, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands. Central bankers generally are judged on their 
success in keeping inflation at bay. Moreover, their tenure generally is longer 
than that of cabinet ministers, so they are less likely to pursue expansionary 
policies and saddle their successors with the resulting problems. 
From this point of view, there do not seem to be compelling reasons to 
forbid experiments with private financial institutions supplying money with a 
more stable purchasing power. Indeed, in many countries banks are free to do so. 
The private Ecu is a point in case. Experience suggests that such alternative 
monies will not play a great role. Even in the turbulent 1970s the public was not 
much interested in deposits denominated in units devised by private banks (Lomax 
1983 p. 274). Freedom of choice for the public may help, though, to stimulate 
good behaviour by the government or at least to give economie agents the 
opportunity to shift to other currencies. Friedman (1984 p. 46) cites the case of 
Mexico, where the share of the US dollar increased from 5 per cent to 20 per cent 
within a short period of time as a result of inflation. 
5.2. One laver or two 
It is highly probable that under a free money supply of the CC kind a two-leyered 
system would remain, not only domestically but internationally as well. In an 
unregulated system, both private and official money suppliers may try to impart 
confidence in the money they create by guaranteeing convertibility into a 
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dominant money with a proven low tendency to loose purchasing power, i.e., in a 
European context, for all practical purposes the Deutsche Mark. Besides, a wish 
to save on transactions costs would see to it that transactions between 
currencies would be routed via a third currency, just as in the present-day 
world, where the dollar still is the dominant vehicle currency (c'f McKinnon 1979 
Ch. 2). There would be no need to confer a monopoly on its suppliers. Whether 
they remain dominant depends on their good conduct. The possibility for the 
public to switch to another currency may act as a spur to governments of 
inflating countries to put their monetary house in order, as they loose 
seigniorage income from money creation if domestic money is crowded out, an 
important consideration especially for economically less-developed countries 
(Fischer 1982). 
It is doubtful if a NME system would completely do away with a two-layered 
system either. Financial institutions have to make payments to each other and 
feel a need for a financial instrument with a fixed nominal value. It is also 
hard to conceive that the public would be willing to renounce the benefits of a 
means of payment with a fixed nominal value or renounce the right to convert bank 
deposits into currency. Again, a dominant money may surface and we are back with 
a two-layered system, which was the villain of the piece in the first place. 
Free banking would not result in a system that differs significantly from 
the present one, because it would remain a two-layered system (cf Selgin and 
White 1987). That does not mean that central banks would spring up automatically. 
Banks might cooperate in running clearing houses, much as Ecu-banks have created 
their own clearing institution. Those clearing houses might evolve into a lender 
of last resort, but they would not conduct monetary policy. Some prudential 
supervision is conceivable too, as the clearing houses might only admit as 
members banks observing a certain minimum capital ratio. 
5.3. Prudential supervision. the lender of last resort and monetary policv in a 
two-lavered svstem 
Free banking in the sense of absence of prudential supervision is a distinct 
possibility, as was shown by Scottish history for the case where a small number 
of relatively large institutions cooperate to ensure the stability of the system. 
It is, however, not clear what welfare gains that would create. There does not 
seem to be convincing evidence that banks can aways completely do without 
supervision, cf the secondary banking crisis in the United Kingdom in the early 
15 
1970's and the 1981 financial crisis in Chile (Harberger 1986 p. 237, Corbo and 
De Melo 1987 p. 137), let alone the American banking crisis in the early 
'thirties, when the Fed just let it run its course. This seems, however, more a 
problem in a fixed-rate world than in a flexible rate world. If banks do not have 
the obligation to change their liabilities at par in another kind of money, the 
value of their liabilities will fall without a liquidity crisis taking place, 
rather like a fall in the foreign-exchange value of domestic currency. As Hellwig 
(1985 p. 583) observes, economie theory has too little to say on these matters to 
warrant any firm conclusions on the question whether government regulation of the 
banking system and the production of inside money should be abolished. 
History nevertheless suggests that a two-layered system cannot easily do 
without a lender of last resort. Kindleberger (1978 Ch. 11, 1987 pp. 294-'5) 
makes much of the role of the lender of last resort in providing stability to the 
financial system. In the international sphere, this implies a hegemonie power 
whose currency will probably function as a dominant money; in the national sphere 
it means a central bank or an institution set up by the financial institutions 
jointly. In a system where the liabilities of one institution are to be exchanged 
at par for those of another one, such an institution is next to indispensable. 
Where there is no obligation to maintain fixed exchange rates such an 
institution can help to prevent erratic exchange rate fluctuations. W i t h a 
government currency most probably assuming the role of dominant money, one cannot 
bank on the self-interest of private bankers for maintaining the purchasing power 
of money (if that is and remains the overriding objective). Wherever a dominant 
money arises, it is imperative to conduct some form of monetary policy, as it 
cannot be assumed that the system automatically produces just the correct volume 
of dominant money to ensure price stability (or any other objective). 
5.4. CC and NME; a final view 
Experiments like those proposed by Hayek do look feasible. Given the increasing 
liberalisation of financial markets competition between various national 
currencies may well intensify. This can happen without a radical transformation 
of the present system, which is undesirable anyway. To take a leaf from Hayek's 
book, the present system is the result of a development spanning centuries rather 
than decades. It should be open to further evolution, but a radical 
transformation could only do harm. It seems likely that, with a move to a 
competing system, the public will prefer an existing currency with a stable 
purchasing power to a new currency created by a private institution. This, how-
16 
ever, is no reason to prevent them from trying. 
The world pictured by HME seems unlikely ever to emerge. Apart from being 
unrealistic in its assumptions about the preferences of the public, it seems 
theoretically flawed, at least in the version as presented by Fama (1980). In his 
model, anything can serve as the unit of account. The system would work as a 
Walrasian system in which the real sector determines relative prices and financ-
ial institutions have no power to influence the general equilibrium. Illing (1985 
p. 116) argues in his critique of this model that perfect capital markets do not 
provide the right framework for analysing banks, just as the Arrow-Debreu 
intertemporal general equilibrium model leaves no place for money. With a perfect 
capital market, the public does not need the banks for providing finance (cf 
Hoover 1988 pp. 157 ff.). Debts can be settled by a direct transfer of financial 
instruments from debtors to creditors and even the payment mechanism provided by 
Fama's banks seems superfluous. 
Note: I have greatly profited from comments by Jaap Koelewijn on a draft of this 
chapter. 
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